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The new Islamic presence in Europe, which is the consequence of a massive and voluntary 
settlement of millions of Muslims in Western societies, owes its visibility partly to the 
Muslim missionary movements from South Asia, which have proven specific strengths in 
shaping the Islamic-religious fields in the Diaspora communities in European countries. The 
new Islamic movements Tablīghī Jamā´at, Da´wat-e Islāmī, and Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī share 
the characteristics of new religious movements in the sense that they have been transformed 
through the confrontation with globalization and modernity. They are believed to be 
comparable in size and scope to Christian Pentecostalism. These three movements share, in 
varying degrees, a Sūfī background, and preach a peaceful Islam. At the same time terrorists 
involved in the bombings in Europe since 2004 regularly visited mosques associated with 
these movements, especially the Tablīghī Jamā´at. All three missionary movements invite 
their members to visit their world headquarters or participate in annual meetings in Pakistan 
or India. The “Islamic project” of the three movements is the “Sunnaization” - that is, the 
reshaping and reconstruction - of the daily routine and the individual markers of identity 
based on the examples of the Prophet and the Salaf as portrayed in the Hadīth literature. This 
so-called “apolitical” Sunnaization can be understood as the privatization or individualization 
of political re-Islamization. Stressing individual transformation it focuses on the private 
sphere instead of the state, and engages with ahadīth rather than the Qur´ān. With a new 
tolerance of ambiguity, Sunnaization combines elements of Sufism and Salafism.1 
 
 
Almost all Western European societies have undergone a seemingly irreversible process of 
secularization since the 1960s. Globalization dissolved the territorial boundaries of traditional 
Christianity and challenged Europe´s hegemonic claim to be the central Christian continent. 
Western Europe is no longer the centre of global Christianity, and most new Christianities, 
Pentecostalism for example,2 are in their dynamic aspects less and less European. By the 
beginning of the third millennium, the one thousand-year-old connection between Christianity 
and West European civilization had come to an end. In this respect one may proclaim the 
emergence of a post-Christian Europe.3  
 
Globalization brought increasing connectedness between places. Trans-societal migration led 
to the emergence of Diasporas, which in turn caused the de-territorialization of religious 
values from their traditional local contexts.4 By de-territorialization, Diasporas have become 
centres of a global transformation of religion: religion undergoes change and somehow adapts 
to the Diaspora.5 Those who constitute the Diaspora community serve as catalysts in 
transforming the old religions in their civilizational homes and societies of origin. Religions 
traditions adapt to the religious marketplace and the cultural codes of change and 
privatization.6 They now become “Americanized”7 in the same way as American Judaism has 
transformed world Judaism. In the context of mutual encounters between Islam and Europe, 
academics speak of two scenarios: the “Europeanization of Islam” and the “Islamization of 
Europe”.8 
 
Islam is currently undergoing a transformation, confronted as it is by globalization on the one 
side and modernity on the other.9 Modernity is clearly visible in how a religious movement 
copes with surfing the wave of individualism and its inherent trends of consumerism, 
pragmatism and experience (voluntarism, pietism). Migrants, who are sometimes forced to 
cope with the anonymity of metropolizes, tend to prefer smaller religious groups,10 which 
enforce the tendency to prioritize religious identity over other chosen identities,11 and 
resemble migrants´ predominantly rural backgrounds in providing mutual social and 
emotional support.12 The Tablīghī Jamā´at is meanwhile believed to be comparable to 
Pentecostalims in size and scope.13 
European legal systems guarantee the fundamental human right of religious freedom. 
Religious freedom in Europe implies the right to conversion and the freedom to proselytize. 
This has led to the emergence of pluralistic religious markets, with competing religious actors 
offering their salvation goods.14 Missionary activities are of the essence for new religious 
movements (NRMs), which are ideally adapted to the challenges of globalization. They 
usually take the form of small religious units.15 NRMs are often mistrusted by the public as 
they appear to threaten secularism.16 The differentiae specificae of NRMs are that i) 
membership is not predetermined by family background, ii) converts are recruited from a 
specific social sphere, mostly the new middle class, iii) a charismatic leader (in Urdū: amīr, 
negrān ) regulates all aspects of life (marriage, eating and sleeping habits, clothing and hair - 
especially beard - style), iv) the markers of belonging are clearly visible, and v) the 
organizational structures are characterized by a certain fluidity. NRMs have a high turnover 
rate, with people joining for a short time and then deciding for one reason or another to drop 
out. Members of NRMs, who are mostly young and relatively highly educated, are generally 
harmless, and should probably be left to practise their religion in peace. Membership usually 
consists of first-generation converts, called reverts or born-agains, who tend to be 
exceptionally enthusiastic, even zealous. In the Diaspora converts are mostly second-
generation migrants who are disillusioned with the society that excluded them, mostly 
unemployed and as yet unmarried.17 This supplies NRMs with a steady flow of inexperienced 
but healthy members who are unencumbered by responsibilities. Their conversion is often a 
result of a long process in which a traditional heritage has lost its meaning. Shortly prior to 
conversion, born-agains often experience a crisis or major transition in their lives. As they 
have also often suffered from social disintegration, sometimes even alienation, the functional 
social network in the NRM is a highly significant factor explaining the attraction of the 
movement. Charismatic groups are highly cohesive. As with other small groups of highly 
religious young men,18 the network is held together by a strong in-group love and not out-
group hate.19 Indeed, social bonds and mutual social and emotional support are the crucial 
elements in the development of a common identity. In an atmosphere of unconditional 
acceptance and support, NRMs reward conformity and implicitly punish alienation.20 At the 
same time NRMs are generally disruptive at the family level and occasionally at the social 
level. As a rule, they reject prevailing religious beliefs. A common characteristic of strongly 
held belief systems is that they are relatively simple and straightforward – they tend to be 
painted in primary colours, without the messy grey areas that older religions have acquired. 
NRMs have charismatic leaders and preach sharp boundaries. Their identity markers are 
mostly simple, and they use plenty of them. The activities of the members are monitored 
closely by a designated observer or “caretaker” (negrān in Urdū). Besides social support and 
relief from personal anxiety, members experience the benefits of travel opportunities and 
health-promoting behaviours (strict prohibition of drugs, alcohol and sexual promiscuity).21 
Another characteristic is the relatively highly homogeneous age, geographical roots and place 
of recruitment. The new forms of religiosity are communitarian, exclusive in the sense that a 
clear line divides the saved from the damned, and inclusive in the sense that all aspects of life 
come under the aegis of religion. They are individualistic, very mobile, weakly 
institutionalized and anti-intellectual.  
 
Many of the NRMs originated in India,22 with Hare Krishna and Osho being the most famous, 
also many other new Islamic movements emerged in South Asia.  
In South Asian Islam two major schools of thought can be distinguished (apart from several 
minor ones). On the one hand is the reformist Dĕobandī School, based on a seminary founded 
1867 in Dĕoband, which represents a “purified” version of Islam in the tradition of the 
founder generation of the religion (as-salaf).23 In 1926 this tradition gave birth to the 
missionary movement, Tablīghī Jamā´at. On the other hand is the Barelwī School,24 a 
reformist counter-reformist movement, close to folk Islam and Sufism, which emanated from 
Bareilly, a city not far from Dĕoband. This school of thought introduced the Islamic Mission, 
Da´wat-e Islāmī (www.dawateislami.net), in 1981.25 In 1991 the Indian sub-branch of the 
Da´wat-e Islāmī broke away to form its own transnational movement, called Sunni Da´wat-e 
Islāmī (www.sunnidawateislami.net). The Dĕobandī and Barelwī schools of thought and their 
respective missionary movements are opposed to each other. In a competitive race for 
numbers they compete for impact and political power. Although they appear at first glance to 
have different backgrounds (Salafī/Wahhābī in the case of Tablīghī Jamā´at and Sūfī in the 
case of the Da´wat-e Islāmīs), both movements are reformist in the sense that they require 
their followers to be personally responsible for their own salvation. They stress the literal 
imitation of the life of the Prophet in all aspects of the daily routine, an Islamic project for 
which I suggest the term “Sunnaization” as this process of Islamization draws its arguments 
from specific commentaries on selected hadīth and focuses on the private sphere rather than 
the political. Despite their extremely militant judgement of contemporary societies and 
individuals, they are overwhelmingly non-violent movements for the repropagation of Islam, 
and, along with the takfir and hijra groups, they constitute peaceful extremist movements in 
the taxonomy of Islamist movements (Al-Ahram Center 2007).26 Employing peer pressure, 
they impose a strict dress code on their adherents and are organized in extremely mobile small 
units of lay preachers (jamā´at, madanī qāfila, qāfila), who invite for weekly and annual 
ijtemā´s, congregations. The structure, organization and approach of the movements are 
similar. But what is the really novel aspect of the new religiosity is its increasing visibility.27 
 
Recent years have witnessed a growing number of young men on the streets, in the mosques 
and at the airports of Europe, all wearing the shalwār-qamīz, which is the traditional dress of 
Muslims in South Asia. The majority wear turbans (´imāma-sharīf), which are either white 
(Tablīghī Jamā´at, Sunni Da´wat-e Islāmī) or green (Da´wat-e Islāmī). For the most part these 
young men travel in groups of between five and ten, visiting Muslims in their homes to invite 
them to the mosque (naikī kī da´wat – invitation to the good), where they themselves eat and 
sleep on their journeys. The notion of organized lay preachers in the footsteps of the Prophet 
is a quite new phenomenon in Europe and North America.28 Since cultural wars have become 
intra-civilizational in response to Western modernity, the activities of both groups aim at the 
“inner mission”, bringing Muslims back to the “real” Islam and saving them from Western 
lifestyles. 
 
From Radicalization to Spirituality 
 
In classical Islam da´wa-proselytization and hijra-Islamization go hand in hand with Jihād. 
In his work The True Emigrant, Ibn Taimiyya (1263-1328) cites the following hadīth: „The 
emigrant (muhājir) is the one who flees that which God has prohibited. The warrior (mujāhid) 
is the one who fights against himself for the sake of God.”29 To flee what God has prohibited 
is obligatory:30 Who believes, emigrates (hajara) and fights.31 The Prophet spread Islam from 
the hijra stronghold through da´wa and Jihad. Within the framework of this historical Islam 
religious leaders have constructed a universal hijra doctrine prescribing migration to the non-
Islamic world in an effort to proselytize for Islam.32 Before non-Muslims could be attacked, 
they had to reject the call (da´wa) to embrace Islam. The religious doctrine of hijra, which 
implies a movement towards Madīna, that is a step into the Utopian Medinensean society, 
obliges migrants who share common spiritual values to depart together, isolate themselves 
from the milieu they come from, and settle elsewhere in order to proselytize. From this 
framework the concepts developed of the different missionary journeys of the Tablīghī 
Jamā´at (for example, gasht as the biweekly preaching patrol in the neighbourhood, khurūj as 
a monthly foray to a nearby city, chillā as an annual journey to Pakistan or elsewhere) and the 
Da´wat-e Islāmī (weekly, monthly, or annual madanī qāfila). Besides this “nostalgia” for 
Madīna the call to go on missions (al-khurūj fī sabil illah bzw. nafar fī sabil illah) combines 
elements of pilgrimage and serious leisure and connects them to Sunnah.33 
The UK based Tablīghī scholar Shaykh Abū Yūsuf Riyadh ul-Haq explains in his sermon 
“The Evil Within”, which is exploring the topic of backbiting while on khurūj, the meaning of 
travelling in the way of Allah in connection to internal conversion:34 
”O believers, when you travel on the earth in the way of Allah. And that is in Jihad…Allah is 
talking about Jihad. Not just going out or not just people sitting at home. Allah is saying: O 
believers, when you go out in the way of Allah, i e. in Jihad. When you go with the intention of 
laying down your life for the sake of Allah Talah. When you leave everything behind you and 
you are willing to sacrifice everything. And you are not just talking about going on to the 
battlefield, you are on the battlefield, you are on a military expedition. Allah is addressing the 
Sahabah…: Then even at such a noble time, even in such a noble course, be careful of what 
you think. And, o believers, when you travel in the way of Allah, then ascertain, verify the 
truth and do not say to anyone who says “Salam” to you, “You are not a believer.” 
 
Tablīghī networks have become vulnerable to exploitation by various militant groups and this 
is probably best documented in the case of Kashmir.35 Some “classical” stories of jihād have 
become popular books in Tablīghī circles and can be found in many Islamic bookstores 
associated with the movement.36 A couple of Europe’s genuine and potential Jihadis have 
been active in pietist movements.37 Some of the perpetrators of the bombings on 11 March 
2004 in Madrid or 7 July 2005 in London, or prominent terrorists like the “American Taliban” 
John Walker Lindh were reported to have participated in Tablīghī activities. In India the 
Tablīghī scholar Sufyān Patangia was accused to have headed a terror cell, which allegedly 
killed former Gujarat Home Minister Haren Pandya;38 and two of the prime suspects for 
torching the Sabarmati Express, a train carrying Hindu pilgrims from Ayodhyā, in February 
2002, killing 58, had links to Tablīghī Jamā´at institutions.39 Some observers (Howard et. al. 
2006, Tarrés/Jordán 2007, Alexiev 2005) claim that these missionary movements radicalize 
young Muslims, who are subsequently sent to Pakistan on a missionary journey and probably 
make contact there with other, more militant groups, among them the Dĕoband-affiliated 
Harakāt al-Mujahedīn.40 Whether these missionary movements play an active political role or 
are used by militant members remains a matter for debate. Numerous Islamist groups, for 
example the Jamā´at-e Islāmī, attack the missionaries for their apolitical attitude, arguing that 
they have a calming effect on Muslims and divert them from Islamization.41 As a result both 
groups, Tablīghī Jamā´at and Da´wat-e Islāmī, were tolerated and even supported by a 
number of governments in South Asia and other Muslim countries as they hoped to use them 
for countering militant groups. In the meantime it seems that post-Islamist, conservative neo-
fundamentalism, aimed primarily at Islamizing society from the bottom up via da´wa, has 
replaced Salafī Jihadism, whose goal was to Islamize society by seizing state power.42  
Islamization policy also made special use of da´wa as a tool for universalizing different 
Islamic identities and integrating them into common political action. Especially in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, the growing impact of the Islamization policy lobby in government agencies 
is evident. Hence there is an increasing contradiction between the self-proclaimed apolitical 
character of these missionary movements and their transformation in modernity, which has 
loaded them with political impact and meaning. 
 
Converting via Community 
 
With an estimated twelve million to fifteen million adherents, the Tablīghī Jamā´at, with its 
world headquarters at the Nizāmuddīn shrine in New Delhi, is among the largest of the 
transnational Islamic movements. Its founder, the charismatic Dĕobandī-trained ´ālim 
Muhammad Ilyās (1885-1944), attempted to turn members of Muslim tribes into lay preachers 
in order to make the transmission of religious knowledge an effective means to counter Hindu 
missionaries. The formation of the Tablīghī Jamā´at in 1926 was a reaction against the Shuddī 
campaign in the early 1920s. 
 World-headquarters of the Tablīghī Jamā´at (left) at the Nizamuddin-shrine (right) in New Delhi, 
copyright: Thomas K. Gugler 
 
This was a missionary campagin of the Ārya Samāj, a Hindu group founded in 1875, which 
tried to convert Indian Muslims, whom it portrayed as Hindu victims of forced conversion to 
Islam.43 The Muslim lay preachers were sent to nearby villages to discuss and spread Islam 
and to deepen their own appreciation of their faith.44 The system basically works through a 
snowball effect: anyone who listens to a sermon and learns about Islam is requested to join a 
group (jamā´at), to travel, to spread some knowledge about the basics of Islam and to call on 
new adherents to volunteer for missionary tours (tashkīl). Rewards in heaven (tawab) are 
promised for these efforts. Muhammad Ilyās developed a six-point (che bātein) programme 
which still serves as the principal guideline for all lay preachers. The six fundamentals of 
Islam are:45 i) to understand the meaning of the kalima, ii) to perform correct and regular 
prayers (salāt), iii) to acquire religious knowledge (´ilm) and actively remember God (zikr), 
iv) to respect all Muslims (ikrām), v) to purify one`s thoughts and intentions (niyyat), and vi) 
to be prepared to preach and invest time in the propagation of religion (nafr). 
The lay preachers stay at the mosques and visit Muslim families in the neighbourhood 
inviting them to join in prayer. After the prayer one of the preachers delivers an inspirational 
religious talk (bayān), explaining the ideas and rules of the movement. They then urge people 
to register for a missionary journey (tashkīl). A basic preaching trip lasts three days. Longer 
missionary tours can last four weeks (chillā), four months (grand chillā) or a whole year. The 
annual congregations in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh draw between one million and two 
million people each, and are among the largest congregations in the Muslim world. Religious 
teaching focuses on a collection of ahadīth, known as “Fazā’il-e A‛māl” (Urdū: Virtuous 
Deeds), written by the nephew of the movement`s founder, Muhammad Zakariyā (1898-
1982).46  
 
The Tablīghī Jamā´at Masjid Tariq Bin Ziyād was established in 1981. On Fridays Muslims line up on the 
street as no space is left inside on of the three floors of the largest mosque in Barcelona, copyright: 
Thomas K. Gugler. 
 
Rediscovering Roots 
 
The Tablīghī Jamā´at began to expand globally in the late 1960s. In Europe the missionaries 
are particularly active in the UK. The European headquarters of the Tablīghī Jamā´at were 
established in 1978 in Dewsbury, and have included a Dĕobandī seminary since 1981, which 
is attended by about 300 boys from all over Europe.47 The Tablīghīs maintain connections 
with about two dozen Dĕobandī seminaries in Britain (for example, in Bury Holcombe since 
1975). As early as 1969, Tablīghīs set up their own centre in France (l` Association Culturel 
Islāmīque). The example of France is important since the Tablīghī Jamā´at was obliged to 
overcome its focus on South Asian immigrants. From France, where Arab youth is the chief 
supporter of the movement, Tablīghī activities spread to North Africa. In Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia Tablīghī Jamā´at has seen an enormous increase in support during the last 10-15 
years. Tablīghī Jamā´at has since spread from there to Spain, setting up the first markaz, the 
Masjid Tariq Bin Ziyād, in Barcelona in 1981 (Tarrés/Jordán 2007),48 being registered since 
1992 at the Entidades Religiosas del Ministerio de Justicia under the name Asociación 
Annur.49 The example of Barcelona is quite interesting as Tablīghī Jamā´at shifted its 
Barcelona markaz in 1985 to the very same house in which the Communist opposition 
gathered against the Franco regime.50 At the Friday prayers, in which I participated during my 
fieldwork in Barcelona in November 2007, around 1,100 Muslims, mostly Arabs from 
Morocco and Algeria, recite namāz at the Tariq Bin Ziyād mosque, which is the biggest 
mosque in Barcelona. Barcelona is an important case in point, as many illegal immigrants 
from Pakistan enter Europe there, coming via Iran, Turkey, and Greece, where they are 
packed in containers and shipped to the port of Barcelona. Newspapers linked the Tariq Bin 
Ziyād mosque with planned bomb attacks on the Barcelona metro system in June 2007 and 
January 2008.51 The suspects, who were arrested in January 2008 on suscipion of planning 
suicide attacks in Spain and Germany, were described as Tablīghī activists.52 In 1975 the 
Tablīghī Jamā´at established itself in Belgium.53 In Israel/Palestine the movement owns seven 
marakaz.54 As yet it does not have its own centre in Germany. Germany’s estimated 500-full 
time members are organized in seven city circles,55 which are centred on mosques owned by 
other institutions. About 800 adherents congregated in the annual ijtemā´ during May 2006 in 
Berlin (An-Nūr mosque). Following disappointment with the Tablīghī work in Germany, the 
world shūrā from India decided that the Indian leadership will intensify its visits to Germany, 
and the inner-German congregation (mashwara) has to take place every two months (instead 
of every four months as in 2005) to discuss the results of missionary activities. 
Although the movement`s founder Ilyās had multiple Sūfī affiliations - Chistiyya, 
Suhrawardiyya, Qādiriyya, and Naqshbandiyya, into which Ilyās was initiated by Rashīd 
Ahmad Gangohī (1829-1905), one of the founders of the seminary of Dĕoband; his main 
affiliation was the Sābiriyya-Chistiyya sub-order - 56 and although their faith bureaucracy 
relies heavily on the Sūfī heritage,57 Tablīghīs preach a purified Islahī-Islam. They reject 
“later” rituals, in particular Sūfī practices, which they condemn as reflecting Hindu influence.  
 
Reliving Madīna 
 
The most important movement among their critics is the rival group Da´wat-e Islāmī. Their 
world headquarters is the Faizān-e Madīna (Spiritual Benefit of Madīna) in Karachi. The 
movement is linked to the Barelwī school of thought. The latter emerged around 1900 in 
response to the puristic dār al-´ulūm (seminary) in Dĕoband to defend traditional Islam, which 
in South Asia is greatly influenced by Sūfī-, saint- and shrine-culture. As saint-culture and 
shrine-culture are accepted by a majority of South Asian Muslims, the Barelwī school of 
thought calls itself Ahl as-Sunna wa´l Jamā´at. While the Da´wat-e Islāmī copies the structure 
and activities of Tablīghī Jamā´at, its members differ in appearance mainly by their green 
turban. The green colour of the turban is regarded as their trademark and has led to their 
popular label “jannat ke tūte”, parrots of paradise. The lay preachers of the Da´wat-e Islāmī 
are bound to the founder and amīr of the movement, Muhammad Ilyās Qādri Attar (born 
1950) by a bay´a, an oath of allegiance. As Madīna and Muhammad Mustafā hold key 
positions, “madanī” prefixes or complements several auspicious terms (for example madanī 
burqa, fikr-e madīna) to constitute a corporate identity. This corporate identity is centred on 
the ideal Islamic society of Madīna, which is meant to be set up within the transnational Sūfī 
brotherhood. “Madīna” also serves as a salutatory address to any adherent. The six points of 
action of the Tablīghī Jamā´at (che baaten) are elaborated into 72 directives, the Madīna 
rewards (madanī in´amat). Each adherent is requested to fill in a form, the madanī card, 
listing up the 72 madanī in´amat, every evening. The chief book of the Da´wat-e Islāmī, 
written by its founder and amīr, also revolves around ahadīth. Resembling the main book of 
the Tablīghī Jamā´at, “Fazā’il-e A‛māl”, it is entitled “Faizān-e Sunnat” (Urdū: Spiritual 
Benefit of the Sunna) and is published in the movement’s press Maktaba tul-Madīna.58 It is 
not yet translated, although it has been through three slightly different editions. As a Sūfī 
movement, its glorification of the prophet (na´t) is a central part of the preaching program. 
After dars, the lesson, read from Faizān-e Sunnat by any lay preacher, the highlight of the 
weekly ijtemā´ is the Fikr-e Madīna, the visualization of the tortures in the hell fires at the 
Day of Judgement, which is a means of daily repenting. For this practice the lights in the 
mosque are turned off and everybody starts crying – or if necessary at least pretending to cry. 
Every individual repents his sins and calls loudly on the beloved Muhammad Mustafā to save 
him. Though I never actively participated, I recall that even observing this ritual in Karachi, 
Multan, Bangalore and Barcelona, was an extremely intense emotional experience for me. 
After the bayān, the lecture given by an Imām, people are informed about missionary 
journeys for which they can sign up. The basic missionary unit is referred to as madanī qāfila 
(Madīna caravan) and its slogan after the bayān is: “qāfile me calo” (Urdū: join the caravan – 
which is the title of Abdullah Azzām`s famous 1987 book). The Da´wat-e Islāmī, as an 
organization connected to the Qādiriyya silsila (line of tradition), is proud to be able to 
present Ibn Taimiyya as a Sūfī of the Qādiriyya order.59 Unlike the Tablīghī Jamā´at, the 
Da´wat-e Islāmī has its own chain of madrassas, with more than a thousand in Pakistan 
alone.60  
 Madrassa-tul-Madina in Mumbai, copyright: Thomas K. Gugler 
 
On the margins of the movement a militant group emerged called Sunnī Tahrīk 
(http://sunnitehreek.com.pk), which was formed in 1992 by the Da´wat-e Islāmī district leader 
(negrān) Salīm Qādrī (murdered in 2001) with the main purpose of taking control of 
Dĕobandī mosques. The movement was connected to the Barelwī organization Zia ul-Qur´ān, 
then headed by Justice Pīr Muhammad Karam Shāh Al-Azhārī (1918-1998) ( http://www.zia-
ul-ummat.com, http://www.zia-ul-quran.com). His Qur´ān translation Jamāl ul-Qur´ān is 
available online on the Da´wat-e Islāmī homepages Faizān-e Madīna (English)61 and Nafs-e 
Islām (Urdū).62 Sunnī Tahrīk was established by Barelwī Muhājir youth, especially after 
Muhājir Qaumi Movement (MQM) activists were forced to join other movements to escape 
persecution by the secret service after the military Operation “Clean-Up” in Karachi in 
1996.63 Sunnī Tahrīk became infamous for the systematic killing of Dĕobandī scholars, 
among them Binori Town chief Yusūf Ludhianvī (1932 – 18 May 2000),64 and Shī´as, for 
example on ´īd-e Milād an-Nabī in 2005, as they resent the Shī´a practice of lighting fires to 
commemorate important religious events.65 The movement was banned for several months in 
2001 after Sunnī Tahrīk were reported to have killed the brother of the then Home Minister, 
Muin ud-dīn Haider. Prior to this no Barelwī organization engaged in organized sectarian 
violence. The leadership of Sunnī Tahrīk was wiped out in a suicide attack at Nishtar Park, 
Karachi, during an īd-e Milād an-Nabī celebration on 11 April 2006. This attack on a Barelwī 
gathering was the biggest-ever sectarian blow in Pakistan, killing 57,66 immediately following 
an “incident”, which the Da´wat-e Islāmī interprets as an attack, in the Da´wat-e Islāmī 
headquarters Faizān-e Madīna in Karachi on 9 April, killing 29.67  
This seems to be the end of Sunnī Tahrīk., which since November 2008 is advertising 
tolerance by its new slogan: “Live and let live.” 
 The markaz of Da´wat-e Islāmī in Barcelona is called Faizān-e Madīna. It was established in April 2007 
and is located just a two-minute walk away from the Tablīghī mosque in El Raval, copyright: Thomas K. 
Gugler. 
 
The Da´wat-e Islāmī has been in existence in the UK for no more than 15 years. The 
European headquarters is the Faizān-e Madīna in Accrington, where they currently establish 
its own seminary. Other centres of the same name can be found in Bradford and Birmingham. 
In Continental Europe the Da´wat-e Islāmī currently operates five centres (marakaz) in 
Greece and three in Spain. The Faizān-e Madīna in Barcelona was set up in April 2007, 
inaugurated during ´īd-e Milād an-Nabī by the UK-based negrān for Europe. In the following 
months the Barcelona Faizān-e Madīna opened subsidiaries in Valencia and Malaga, and took 
over another Barelwī mosque, the Centro De Cultura Jāmĕ Masjid Ghulamāne Mustafā 
Catalunya (cultural centre “Congregational Mosque of the Lovers of Mustafa”) in Besos, a 
suburb of Barcelona.68  
 
In 1991 the negrān of the Indian branch of 
Da´wat-e Islāmī, Muhammad Shākir ´Ālī 
Nūrī, split off to form the independent 
movement Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī, which 
has its world headquarters in Mumbai. 
Their darsī kitāb “Faizān-e Sharī´at” is 
meanwhile officially rewritten and 
renamed “Barakāt-e Sharī´at” (Urdū: 
Blessings of the shari´a),69 which the press of the Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī, Maktaba-e Taiba, 
has partly published in English under the same title. The doctrinal affiliation of this movement 
is also Barelwī. The highlight of the weekly ijtemā´ is the zikr-e Madīna, the call to the 
Beloved Prophet to save one from the tortures of hells. Besides the weekly ijtemā´ on 
Saturdays at their headquarters, the Ismā´īl Habīb Masjid in Mumbai, the movement has its 
European headquarters, Noor Hall, in Preston, UK, where adherents gather for an annual 
ijtemā´ in May. Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī organizes regular youth camps in Manchester at the 
North Manchester Jāmia Mosque. Other centres are in Blackburn (Razā Masjid), Bolton 
(Madīna Masjid), and Leicester (`Usmānī Masjid). 
      
Restoring “Islamic” Prominence 
 
Tablīghī Jamā´at, Da´wat-e Islāmī and Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī stress the strict and literal 
imitation of the life of the Prophet; and although the approach of the three movements is anti-
intellectual, their discourses have been extremely influential in shaping the Islamic religious 
fields70 in the modern world.71 They focus their teachings on their respective commentaries on 
a specific collection of ahadīth, namely, Fazā’il-e A‛māl, Faizān-e Sunnat or Barakāt-e 
Sharī´at. These “handbooks” teach how to Sunnaize the daily routine as well as the course of 
life and the individual markers of identity based on the example of the Prophet and the Salaf, 
the pious ancestors. They teach a very specific Islamic etiquette in drinking, eating, walking, 
greeting, sleeping, brushing teeth, combing the beard, etc; and I follow Roy (2005) in 
interpreting this as the privatization or individualization of traditional Islamic 
fundamentalism. It is apolitical in the sense that it focuses on the private sphere rather than the 
political. In this respect agents of fundamentalisms transformed by privatization are – as were 
Protestant movements in their time - paradoxically agents of secularization as they 
individualize and thereby de-socialize religious observances (Roy 2007: 76). Furthermore, 
neo-fundamentalists72 draw their arguments from hadīth or interpretations of comparable 
material, especially dreams in which the Prophet appeared, rather than from the Qur´ān – as 
did the Islamic fundamentalists.73 As they draw their arguments from a different fundament I 
find the term “neo-fundamentalism” problematic and probably misleading in the case of 
Islamic neo-fundamentalisms as I do the label “Islamization” for their “Islamic projects”. I 
would prefer to call their Islamic projects, that is, their virtual direction of change in society,  
“Sunnaization”, as it is a process that encourages people to establish the “Sunnas of the 
Prophet”, whereby every individual establishes deep ties to the Prophet in his personal 
spheres of daily life and thereby regulates his behaviour by either substituting norms of 
behaviour (for example, cutting instead of shaving a beard) or integrating additional essential 
parts into otherwise unchanged behaviour (for example, doing zikr - active remembrance of 
God by a specific auspicious mantra – while stepping aboard a bus with the right foot first). 
Sunnaization combines Sūfī elements,74 as it connects all individual activities to the beloved 
Prophet Muhammad Mustafā, with Salafī elements, as it stresses the strict and literal imitation 
of the Salaf. And anybody talking to different kinds of fundamentalist will easily notice the 
completely different rationalities among the agents of either Islamization or Sunnaization. The 
killer argument of traditional Islamists is: “This is Islam”, “(…) we set as our criterion the 
book of God to which we all owe allegiance and to which we all turn, then we will be on 
agreed ground.”75 Meanwhile the lay preachers argue: “This is the Sunna of Our Beloved 
Prophet.” And this is why the movements focus on a virtual and translocal Madīna, the dar 
as-sunna (abode of sunna), instead of any state government. Yet these movements have an 
enormous political impact, which shines through in a statement in the British Barelwī 
magazine The Islamic Times (August 2006): 
It is especially important to emphasise that the religious is the political when direct politics in 
so many Muslim countries has failed, or is very difficult due to nightmarish secret police 
persecution. (…) To change the World, all you have to do is to be religious.76 
 
Sunnaization has a special attraction for converts and Muslim youth, as it is a process in 
which anybody can autonomously generate symbolic capitals. Muslim youth and converts, 
who usually occupy an inferior role in the Islamic religious field, which is traditionally 
dominated by male elders, autonomously generate social, trust, and authenticity capital by 
visibly Sunnaizing their norms of behaviour and stage manage their imitation of the Salaf. In 
this respect Sunnaization is also a tool for social mobility, empowering those who 
traditionally are subordinated to Muslim male elders. Through Sunnaization anybody can 
become a lay preacher and start to restructure the Islamic field in his neighbourhood, or, to 
use the metaphor of the pluralistic religious market economy: 
 (T)he commodity they are prompted to put on the market, promote and sell are themselves. 
They are, simultaneously, promoters of commodities and the commodities they promote (...) 
The test they need to pass in order to be admitted to the social prizes they covet demands 
them to recast themselves as commodities: that is, as products capable of catching the 
attention and attracting demand and customers.77 
 
khurūj fī sabil illah 
 
Islamic missionary movements in post-Christian Europe are often perceived as clashing with 
secularism.78 Tablīghī Jamā´at and the Da´wat-e Islāmīs generate broad visibility by 
occupying public spaces with their religious signs and symbols, which they use ostentatiously 
to construct and formulate their identity. Both groups have an obvious impact on how Islam is 
practised in their neighbourhood. This may contribute to the impression among the public that 
both movements are associated with radical groups. Yet the inner logic of missionary groups 
and the way in which both movements operate are not helpful in the recruitment processes of 
Jihadī groups. Indeed peaceful fundamentalist Muslim groups may help to promote a 
conciliatory message and repudiate terrorist violence.79 Their help could be essential to efforts 
to neutralize terrorist networks since they “fish in the same waters” as militant groups. They 
attract the same clusters of socially alienated and inexperienced young men, whose lack of 
responsibilities is combined with a love of adventure and a burning desire to save the world.80 
The lay preachers provide them with a rather dichotomous world view, but a peaceful 
alternative. Having entered the mainstream of the new and transnational Islamization 
transformed through modernity, which more accurately should be named Sunnaization, the 
two movements attract opportunists, who join to operate under cover and escape police 
persecution. Although the movements have long followed the policy of not asking where their 
adherents come from (since everyone is supposed to repent, revert and be integrated), their 
professional and extremely bureaucratic organizational structure has in the last five years 
developed strict and bureaucratic procedures for checking the identity of potential members 
and limiting the infiltration of militant elements by other movements. This perspective reveals 
the overlap of different milieus – political, militant, social, cultural, and spiritual. Militant 
Jihādīs now tend to look up to the missionaries and see da´wa as the spiritual Jihād,81 the 
greater Jihād. Missionaries say the time for the smaller, militant Jihād has not yet come: 
people first have to reform and be educated in real Islam.  
 
Parrots of Paradise 
 
Western observers find it irritating that both movements are organized differently from 
Western institutions. It is almost impossible to find a written agenda, membership lists or fees, 
or a transparent management or institutional ownership structure. Although their organization 
is bureaucratic, they remain pietist movements that revolve around specific members and 
operate via informal, flexible and mutual face-to-face contacts. Although these movements 
spread Salafī symbols and values, they are organized as a Sūfī movement, i.e. there is no fixed 
membership and frequently a lack of clear-cut boundaries. Members enter the milieu of the 
missionary groups and leave it again. Muslim businessmen, students and traders are often 
merely seeking a spiritual break from the Western lifestyles. Migrants, who may lack 
language skills and are trapped in a village or a certain neighbourhood, discover a new 
mobility in these movements. It is difficult for the Western public sphere to begin dialogue 
with these movements: neither participates in public dialogue projects, and there is no official 
representative to act as a contact for journalists or politicians. Hence, the leaders of the 
movements remain behind the activism of lay preachers. Their property and institutions are 
mostly in private hands. In European countries, their schools are trust-owned, so that the 
movements themselves do not become legal persons.  
 
As a rule modern societies become increasingly diverse and religiously pluralistic.82 Capitalist 
transformation of traditional communities and the global circulation of ideas by new media 
and the information technology have led to a situation in which people have had to find new 
modes of coexistence.83 As modernity comes with growing pressure to draw boundaries and 
formulate identities, globalization also brings a new ambiguity into Islamic interpretations, 
enabling them to integrate different Islamic identities.84  At the same time it is clear, that it is 
only a relatively small group believing to hold a monopoly on the truth, trying to convince 
“the rest”. They represent the religion of the margins and not the middle. 
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